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“Combining Hard and Soft Power to Gain Access: Lessons from NATO’s Success”
Working Paper Draft, January 24, 2022
Kyle J. Wolfley
Note- These views are the author’s own and do not reflect the US Army, Department of Defense, or US
Government.
Abstract: The emerging great power rivalry is causing grave concern amongst policymakers, who fear China’s
growing military and economic expansion at the expense of the US and its allies. By focusing narrowly on material
sources of power, however, these worries largely ignore the emerging role of soft power or what E.H. Carr labelled
“power over opinion” for influence over partners, which sometimes result in tangible security benefits such as
operational access, basing, and overflight rights. To change perceptions of the benefits of cooperation, major
powers may leverage the information tool of statecraft to alter the preferences of domestic actors, such as politicians,
military officers, or the general public. In order to better understand the logics by which major powers gain access,
this paper explores a case of NATO’s successful use of soft power for material benefit: the attainment of overflight
privileges in Eastern Europe for the air campaign against Serbia in 1999. By understanding NATO’s success, the
alliance can better leverage the effective combination of economic and soft power to compete in today’s challenging
international system.

In September 2019, Taiwan suffered two major political losses as the South Pacific
nations of Kiribati and the Solomon Islands ended diplomatic ties with the increasingly isolated
Asian nation. China’s One Nation policy requires that states choose between the People’s
Republic of China or Taiwan, and both of these small Pacific nations favored the massive
mainland over the small island nation. Later in May 2021, reports surfaced that Chinese officials
promised to restructure a Kiribati airstrip on the Kanton Atoll, which onlookers feared would be
used for military purposes. This report followed others that revealed China’s growing
geopolitical ambitions, to include its first overseas military base in Djibouti and negotiations
with Cambodia to build additional facilities at Ream Naval Base.1 China’s leaders deny
expansionist motivations, yet historical great power behavior predicts that China will continue to
seek bases to access vital materials and resupply its military protecting these resources.2
The competition for foreign access, basing, and overflight (ABO) privileges is
commonplace in practice, yet under-examined in the proliferating literature on great power
rivalry. Theories of deterrence take ABO for granted: deterrence by denial assumes that military
troops and hardware are stationed overseas, while deterrence by punishment presumes that
aircraft are authorized to fly over and re-supply on foreign territory. The field of geopolitics is
rife with arguments that territory drives political decision-making, yet falls short of investigating
why countries are willing to give up parts of their precious sovereignty in a competitive
international system.3 The intensity of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was a product of the
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geographic proximity of Soviet basing and access to the US homeland, yet Cuban acceptance of
foreign offensive systems (at its own peril) is both assumed and puzzling.
Since the end of World War II, the benefits of American hegemony and access are often
taken for granted, but this advantage is likely to decline in the future. The US enjoys, by one
count, over 800 military bases abroad and access to territory and airspace that ensure the US
military can reach all parts of the world.4 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 30
members and dozens of partners improve America and the West’s operational reach, yet
acquiring overseas bases and operational access is no small feat. Even if civilian and military
leaders agree that stationing American troops would be mutually beneficial, the need to
overcome political opposition is often present. Requests for access may be rejected, even by
allies: Turkey’s parliament denied its territory for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, while Spain’s
parliament voted to close the US Air Force’s Torrejon Air Base in 1988. Conversely, access
may be granted by non-allies: Romania and Bulgaria authorized NATO to use its airspace in
Operation Allied Force 1999, an important case of NATO’s soft power influence for hard power
gain.
Largely through transactional economic statecraft, Chinese leaders are attempting to buy
access in the Pacific Island region to improve its military reach in the ongoing great power
rivalry. Yet NATO’s influence in the 1990s reveals that access sometimes relies on the skillful
use of soft power or what E.H. Carr labelled “power over opinion”. In addition to security and
economic incentives, NATO should leverage the information tool of statecraft to convince
foreign politicians, military officers, and public audiences that cooperation is beneficial for the
partner and shape the environment in its favor.5 This persuasion may result in material benefit,
explored below through NATO’s acquisition of overflight privileges in Eastern Europe for the
air campaign against Serbia in 1999. By understanding NATO’s successful use of soft power for
hard power gain, the alliance can posture for the evolving geopolitical competition.

The Power to Gain Access
By its nature, access and basing rights allow one country to use the sovereign territory of
another, a feature of statehood that countries jealously guard. There are several routes to access,
most notably through threats, transactions, and attraction. One way to distinguish routes to
access is to apply classical realist E.H. Carr’s three forms of power: military power, economic
power, and power over opinion.6 Militarily, one state could invade and demand the use of these
bases (such as the Soviet Union against the Warsaw Pact), or convince the target state that the
security threat of a mutual adversary necessitates the forward presence. Economically, a state
4

David Vine, Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2015), Chapter 8.
5
On the use of military organizations to construct more favorable environments, see Kyle J. Wolfley, Military
Statecraft and the Rise of Shaping in World Politics (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021); Kyle J. Wolfley,
“Military Power Reimagined: The Rise and Future of Shaping,” Joint Force Quarterly 102, No. 3 (2021): 20-27.
6
Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations (London: MacMillan Press, 1981).

2

may offer aid as a “carrot” for cooperation, or threaten the “stick” of sanctions if the target
country refuses to comply. Finally, a country could attempt to influence the minds of the
leaders, soldiers, and public opinion by emphasizing its culture, political values, or legitimacy in
foreign policy. Despite the conventional wisdom that this form of power is less important the
others, Carr argues that power over opinion is “not less essential for political purposes than
military or economic power, and has always been closely associated with them.”7 Carr’s
experience in the British Ministry of Information during the interwar period led him to believe
that political persuasion was necessary in the modern era of mass communication, which
increased the number of individuals whose opinion was “politically important.”8
Though Carr focused his discussion on wartime propaganda to sap an adversary’s morale
while maintaining one’s own, another aspect of Carr’s power over opinion is similar to Joseph
Nye’s concept of “soft power,” a term he coined in 1990 that has been lauded by some and
derided by others. Nye argues that soft power is the ability to get the outcomes one prefers
through attraction rather than coercion or payments and is a hallmark of America’s post-Cold
War foreign policy.9 Yet critics argue that soft elements of US power—the universality of the
English language, magnetism of American universities, and strength of Silicon Valley—are
largely uncontrollable by governments and have failed to replace hard military power in
international politics.10 These critiques go too far by assuming that soft power is a replacement
for—and not, as Carr argued, complementary with—hard power. Moreover, these arguments set
too high a standard: soft power can be useful short of preventing war between rivals or turning
enemies into friends.11
A more productive understanding of soft power would investigate how neutral states
choose between great power rivals or why states perceive one another as friend or foe. For
instance, when states assess threats, they look not only at material capabilities, but also the social
interactions and intentions of the adversary. Britain and France possess far more nuclear
weapons than North Korea, yet the former pair of states are friends of the United States, while
North Korea is foe.12 Some realist scholars acknowledge that alliance-formation is not only
about balancing against the most resource-rich state, but the one with aggressive intent,
acknowledging the role of perception in threat assessment.13 Because the determination of ally
versus adversary relies on social perceptions, soft power changes how states view each other and
whether cooperation will be useful or not. Soft power is not limited to democracies where voters
are the target of public diplomacy: reflecting on the origins of modern propaganda, Carr argues
that Nazi Germany’s power over opinion had an equal place with its military and economic
7

E.H. Carr, 132.
Carr, 133-145, quote on 133.
9
Joseph Nye, “Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept,” Palgrave Communications 3,
17008 (2017): https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.8.
10
Eliot A. Cohen, The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force (New York:
Basic Books, 2016). See also Christopher Layne, “The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power,” in Soft Power and US
Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2010): 63-94.
11
See, for instance, Cohen, 16 and
12
Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, No. 1 (1995): 73.
13
Stepehen Walt, Alliance Formation.
8

3

power during the 1930’s.14 Moreover, he notes that Soviet leaders were effective in leveraging
power over opinion by convincing the allies not to intervene in its civil war and increasing the
number of adherents through the first international propaganda organization: Communist
International.15
If power is the ability to get others to do (or want) what you want, then acquiring ABO
relies on the deft use of soft power to build long-term partnerships without promises of
protection or payments. Short of invasion, convincing a former adversary or even neutral state to
abdicate parts of their sovereignty requires legitimacy and persuasion. During the Cold War,
“spheres of influence” implied that superpowers relied on power over opinion to keep partner
states under their control (as well as threats of intervention, in the case of the Soviet Union).
Today, observers may take for granted the intense cooperation and integration between Western
and Eastern European states, yet during the 1990s most Eastern European politicians, military
officers, and publics were not ready to allow the former adversary to place troops on their
homeland.
The divisions between these types of power—especially the line between hard payments
and soft persuasion—is not always clear and the overlap is apparent in business marketing.
Instead of only offering cheaper prices for goods, private firms invest heavily in marketing to
influence the minds of potential consumers to improve its brand and convince the consumer that
its product is attractive. Some businesses engage in philanthropy not only to benefit society, but
also to improve perceptions of their brand which, if successful, will increase their bottom line.16
Applying this analogy to international politics, states may couple economic aid with strategic
communication and public diplomacy to convince the target state’s population that cooperation is
beneficial and long-term. Promises of financial aid surely have a transactional character, but
playing the role of a benevolent, trustworthy state is likely to have longer-run impacts than a
simple “purchase” for access. Ultimately, a smart state would combine several approaches to
achieve its desired outcome and the case study below reveals how NATO attempted several
approaches to achieve overflight rights for war in the late 1990s.

NATO’s Acquisition of Access in the Kosovo Air Campaign
When Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic ordered the killing of ethnic Albanians in January
1999, NATO leaders met to determine to how the alliance would respond. Two months later in
March, nineteen NATO leaders agreed to intervene through aerial bombings designed to compel
Milosevic to halt the ethnic cleansing waged against Albanians. The 78-day air campaign ended
with Milosevic’s concession and military scholars disagree as to whether the air campaign alone
compelled Milosevic’s surrender. Some argue that the campaign represented a rare case of
successful coercion through air power, while others contend that the threat of a ground invasion
14
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and growing domestic instability were the factors that changed Milosevic’s mind.17 Regardless,
in order to make both air and ground threats credible, NATO required expanded access to bases,
territory, and airspace that could only be accomplished by persuading former adversaries to
comply. As the use of airspace and airbases on NATO territory became insufficient in the
campaign to coerce Milosevic by mid-April, NATO leaders requested that Eastern Europe
increase access for military operations. By April 1999, former Warsaw Pact states—and recently
ascended NATO members—Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland offered or provided basing
rights for allied aircraft. Aspiring allies Bulgaria and Romania also contributed: Bulgaria
permitted allied aircraft to transit its airspace and Romania provided NATO air controllers access
to its NATO-compatible radar coverage system, which was procured through the Warsaw
Initiative, a feature of the Partnership for Peace program.18
The roots of access for the Kosovo campaign can be located in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace (PfP) Program, which was launched in 1994 in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
Union and emerging crisis in the Balkans. The purpose of the program was to create security
relationships between NATO and former European communist states with the hope that these
interactions could reduce remaining Cold War tensions and be leveraged in future multilateral
humanitarian missions (as well as prepare select countries for potential NATO membership).
The practical aspects of PfP were military exercises and workshops hosted by the Marshall
Center in Garmisch, Germany. As US Secretary of State Christopher Warren remarked about the
program: “There can be no better way to establish a new and secure Europe than to have soldiers
from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and the other new democracies work with NATO to
address their most pressing security problems.”19 The military exercises took place on both sides
of the former Iron Curtain: the first exercise was hosted in Poland, while the second took place in
Louisiana.20 Former Warsaw Pact states Bulgaria and Romania hosted PfP exercise “Cooperative
Determination” on their territory, respectively in 1995 and 1996.21
NATO leaders viewed PfP as a necessary vehicle for European security because despite
the end of the Cold War, animosity between East and West remained. A 1995 RAND report
revealed that senior Polish officers were skeptical of the program because of PfP’s insistence on
changing doctrine and the rejection of self-sufficiency in favor of dependency on allies. The
same report also credits the PfP with softening the German public’s views on building military
relationships with the former communist East.22 As late as 1997, some Czech polls indicated
17
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that more than half of public opinion would say “no” to NATO accession.23 As two senior
officials in the NATO Political Affairs division during early PfP development argue, PfP was
part of a broader attempt by Western Europe to extend security institutions and make cooperation
more palatable to its Eastern neighbors.24 Reflecting on the first year of Romania’s participation
in PfP, Romanian Minister of State and Foreign Affairs Teodor Melescanu argued that the
program, “is an excellent conduit for improving relations with our neighbors, particularly
through the positive impact military collaboration has on general bilateral relationships.”25
When NATO leaders decided to intervene through Operation Allied Force in March
1999, ABO beyond NATO members’ territory were necessary for allied bombings to be
successful. However, the alliance ran into obstacles as the operation’s legitimacy was in
question: the mission was not formally sanctioned by the United Nations, was opposed by
Russia, and involved aircraft from only 13 of NATO’s 19 members. For the first four weeks of
the bombing campaign, 6,000 NATO sorties struck military and industrial sites in Serbia in an
attempt to halt Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing. Despite these operations, the Serbian government
reinforced thousands of army and police into Kosovo and increased its use of aircraft and
helicopter to target Albanians. To increase pressure on the Serbian government, NATO Supreme
Allied Commander General Wesley Clark argued that roughly 300 additional aircraft would be
required as allied air bases—including those in Italy—were becoming overcrowded.26
At the start of the air operations on March 24, 1999, the Bulgarian government granted
NATO use of its airspace; however, it opposed any airstrikes or ground assaults originating from
its territory. On April 19th NATO officials requested unrestricted access to Bulgaria’s airspace,
which the president and parliament understood would increase Bulgaria’s involvement in aerial
bombings against Serbia and would likely be opposed by its public. According to a
Congressional Research Service report, Bulgarian public opinion polls at the time indicated that
the majority opposed NATO air strikes and the Socialist Party staged anti-NATO rallies in
Sofia.27 Two days later, Bulgarian prime minister Ivan Kostov said his country would grant
NATO a 90-mile band of airspace along its Western border with Serbia and Macedonia, though
its constitutional court and parliament would be required to endorse it.28 When the measure
came to parliament, the debate lasted five hours and the minority former communist party
offered stiff resistance.29
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Despite the domestic opposition to air strikes, the president and some politicians agreed
that Bulgaria had no other choice but to assist NATO.30 On May 8th, the Bulgarian parliament
agreed to grant NATO aircraft use of its airspace for strikes against Yugoslavia with a 154 to 83
vote in favor following long and acrimonious debate. Outside parliament, thousands rallied for
and against the decision, supporting the opposition which was led by the Socialist party of
former communists. Supporting the measure, Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihailova argued,
"Those who vote against (granting NATO access to Bulgaria's airspace), apart from the moral
issue of silent complicity, will vote for prolonging the conflict and against a united Europe. Such
a vote will erase Bulgaria from the economic and political map of Europe."31
Romanian leaders were also in a difficult situation, given the historical ties to Yugoslavia
and opposition to Kosovo’s independence as a similar secessionist movement in Transylvania
was brewing. Romanian President Emil Constantinescu initially sought a diplomatic solution
short of war; however, when talks failed, his government argued that “Romania considers that a
NATO intervention for putting an end to the conflict is both necessary and legitimate.”32 At the
outset, Romania authorized NATO to operate in its airspace for limited, “emergency” use since
the country shared a treaty with Yugoslavia that prohibited the use of airspace by a third party.
After bombings commenced, public opinion polls revealed a drop in support for Romanian
ascension to NATO from 67 to 52 percent. In April, NATO officials requested unrestricted use
of Romanian airspace, which required a parliamentary vote. On April 22nd, the parliament voted
225 to 21 (with 99 abstentions).33 Interestingly, both Romania and Bulgaria denied overflight
permissions to Russia, which it would use to resupply troops its deployed to Pristina following
the NATO air campaign.
After touring Kosovo border crossings into Macedonia, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair spoke before the Romanian parliament on May 4th, 1999 to persuade the Romanian people
to continue allowing NATO’s operations through its airspace. He argued that the only
appropriate action for an emerging democracy such as Romania was to take a firm stance against
Milosevic. He compared Serbia to Germany in 1945, lauding the latter country for
democratizing and joining NATO only ten years after the fall of the Third Reich. Blair
acknowledged that Romanians felt the effects of the airstrikes more intensely than Britons, but
appealed to the public to endure in its fight to end ethnic violence in Europe. In addition to
promises to campaign for Romania’s admittance to the European Union, Blair promised
economic aid to offset the drop in oil exports and blocked trade along the Danube River.34

Karen Donfried, “Kosovo: International Reactions to NATO Air Strikes,” Congressional Research Service,
April 21, 1999.
31
Jan de Weydenthal/Stoyanka Kancheva, “Yugoslaiva: Bulgaria Grants NATO Access to Airspace—
Grudingly,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 9, 1999, Yugoslavia: Bulgaria Grants NATO Access To
Airspace -- Grudgingly (rferl.org)
32
Steven Lee Myers, “Crisis in the Balkans: In Kosovo; Serbs Reinforcing Troops in Kosovo Despite
Bombing,” New York Times, April 20, 1999.
33
Joseph Fitchett, “Romania and Bulgaria Approval Will Allow Campaign to Expand: NATO Gets Right To
Use Airspace Bordering Serbia,” New York Times, April 21, 1999.
34
“Blair: Cast out Milosevic,” BBC News, May 4, 1999, BBC News | UK Politics | Blair: Cast out Milosevic.
30

7

On June 9th, 1999, Milosevic finally surrendered. A month later, NATO Secretary
General Javier Solana wrote an op-ed for a Romanian newspaper thanking the Romanian people
for its steadfast support of NATO operations in Kosovo, including the use of Romanian
airspace.35 He also pointed out that Romania was the first to join the Partnership for Peace
program. Romania and Bulgaria continued to host the rotating “Cooperative Key” PfP exercise
on their territories: Romania’s Mihail Kolganiceanu airbase in 2000 and Bulgaria’s Graf
Ignatievo airbase in 2001 and 2003.36 The evidence above—though tentative and in need of
further research—of NATO’s ability to acquire additional ABO privileges in states with some
political opposition reveals how leaders can combine economic aid with soft power to achieve
material benefits. The discussion and conclusion below compare China’s narrow use of
economic power to improve its access in the Pacific Island region and how NATO can combine
forms of power for access in the future.

Conclusion: Comparing China and NATO’s Attempts at Access
China’s economic statecraft is gaining widespread attention and the islands of Kiribati are
emerging as a focal point for basing competition. Kiribati is located 3,000 km southwest of
Hawaii and is near the US Marshall Islands, which US hosts missiles test sites. In 1997, China
placed a satellite monitoring station on the South Pacific Island—rumored to be its first satellite
station outside of mainland China—raising concern amongst US defense officials, who worried
about China’s ability to interrupt communications and monitor rocket launches from Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California.37 In 2004, Kiribati’s President Anote Tong, whose party recently
rose to power, cut diplomatic ties with China and shifted its alignment with Taiwan. However,
the countries resumed diplomatic ties in 2019 after Kiribati ended ties with Taiwan.
Interestingly, Kanton (with a runway set to be repaired for commercial purposes by China) was
used for bombing raids by American planes during World War II. In 2019, the Solomon Islands
also cut formal diplomatic relations with Tawain and recognized China.
China claims that because Taiwan is a province of China, it has no right to create formal
ties with other sovereign countries. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu claimed that
Kiribati’s pivot was the result of Chinese promises for commercial airplanes and ferries.
Taiwanese government officials interpreted this move as an attempt to diplomatically isolate
Taipei and convince its population that the government was incapable of exerting influence
abroad, undermining the ruling Democratic Progressive Party in favor of the China-friendly
opposition.38 China is already providing some of its scarce Sinopharm vaccine to the Solomon
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Islands as part of its “Health Silk Road” initiative.39 It appears that Chinese leaders are
beginning to understand the importance of improving its image abroad through generous aid.
The brief discussion of NATO’s and China’s efforts indicate that although both actors
leverage economic and soft power to increase access abroad, NATO appears to emphasize values
such as democracy and human rights while China appears—at the moment—to favor economic
incentives. Over its history, NATO officials had to grapple with the dilemma between
establishing bases for operational necessity and promoting democracy abroad. During the Cold
War, the US negotiated with dictators such as Spain’s Franco, Portugal, and the Philippines to
ensure access for deterrence against the Soviets. Alexander Cooley argues that despite the allure
of a long-standing dictatorships, democracies are more likely to honor stationing commitments in
the long run.40 Moreover, through an empirical study of US operational access requests from
1945-2014, a RAND study in 2015 determined that access permission is more likely when the
US mission is considered legitimate, the host nation was an “enduring partner,” and host-nation
domestic opposition was low.41 Thus, a tentative generalization suggests that NATO’s attempts
to emphasize values through information and public diplomacy are likely to be more effective
than China’s use of short-term economic transactions.
At the same time, soft power alone is likely insufficient—even British Prime Minister
Tony Blair promised economic aid to offset Romania’s loss of revenue—and a combination of
economic and soft power will likely work best. For instance, in an effort to undermine Chinese
economic statecraft through the Belt and Road Initiative, the US, Australia, and Japan announced
an initiative to fund the first undersea cable to connect Kiribati, Naura, and the Federated States
of Micronesia to the internet. Not only will this project provide an economic boost to the region,
but these nations are likely to view this deal as more legitimate and trustworthy than what China
has offered through Huawei. As the Australian Prime Minister’s office released statement notes,
“This is more than an infrastructure investment… It is a further demonstration of our shared
commitment to quality, transparent, fiscally sustainable, catalytic infrastructure partnerships
with, and between, Pacific nations.”42 This project follows one in 2018 in which the Australian
government offered $200 million subsidized undersea fiber optic cable to Papau New Guinea
and the Solomon Islands, which blocked a similar effort by China’s Huawei.43 In other words,
economic and soft power are complementary and are best implemented together.
Given China’s efforts to expand and Russian intervention in Ukraine, the race for ABO
continues today and NATO officials should explore the causes and consequences of access
competition. Recently, US officials secured access to two airports in eastern Slovakia and
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announced the construction of three Norwegian airfields and one naval base.44 Although this
construction would not include separate American bases, this announcement was surprising
given Norway’s long resistance to foreign bases in peacetime or the stockpiling of nuclear
arms.45 Russian officials have long charged that NATO expansion is causing the intense security
dilemma in Eastern Europe, and NATO officials should understand that ABO ‘success’ for the
alliance may signal an offensive ‘threat’ to Russia.46 Thus, scholars and practitioners would be
wise to more thoroughly investigate the causes and consequences of access competition.
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